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EXPLANATION OF RECORD ON REVIEW 
The following items in explaining the Record on Review 
may be helpful to the Court: 
1. SUPPRESSION HEARING TRANSCRIPT -- A motion to 
suppress evidence was presented to the Court before 
trial. A transcript of that proceeding was prepared, 
but the original was apparently lost or misplaced. 
After conference with the Court and counsel, it was 
determined that a copy of that transcript would be 
supplied as an original. A stipulation in that regard 
has been submitted. To distinguish the transcript of 
the suppression hearing from the trial transcript, the 
designation MSHTM will be utilized for the Suppression 
Hearing Transcript and the usual designation of T,TR,f 
will be employed for the two volume trial transcript. 
2. EXHIBITS -- It was initially thought that all 
exhibits were forwarded to the Supreme Court by the 
District Court, and then transferred to this Court 
with other documents comprising the record. It was 
discovered that such was not the case. The exhibits 
were then located in the District Court Clerk1s 
Explanation of Record on Review 
- 2 -
office. Defendant's counsel then filed a request for 
the Clerk to forward those documents to this Court. 
Of those, Exhibit #10 is missing. Exhibit #10 is the 
cocaine itself and remains in the custody of law 
enforcement personnel. The originals of Exhibits #12, 
#13 and #14 were withdrawn by the State and copies 
were supplied in their place. Two packages of 
exhibits will be found. One package will contain the 
exhibits for the trial of Villa and the other package 
will contain the exhibits received in the instant 
matter. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ft 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, * Case No. 860232-CA 
vs. * 
ELIAS R. DeALO, * 
Defendant and * 
Appellant. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE 
OF PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT 
The Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, §5, UCA §78-2-2, 
and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Transfer to 
this Court was made under Rule 4A(a), Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Jurisdiction appears from UCA §78-2a-3, and Rule 
3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Defendant was tried by jury in the District Court for 
the offense of Possession With Intent To Distribute For Value A 
Controlled Substance in contravention of UCA §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), 
a second degree felony. The Jury returned a verdict of guilty 
and Defendant was sentenced by the Court to an indeterminate 
term in the Utah State Prison of not less than one, nor more 
than fifteen years, and a fine of $10,000.00. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues for 
resolution on appeal: 
1. Did the Court improperly hold that Defendant 
lacked standing to contest the search of the 
vehicle which he was driving and the seizure of 
items located therein. 
2. Did the Court err in charging the Jury with 
an nAiding and Abetting" instruction as defined 
in UCA §76-2-202. 
3. Did the Court err in allowing Exhibit 11 (A 
California search warrant and supporting 
affidavit) in evidence. 
4. Did the Court err in allowing Exhibit 14 (A 
ledger of California drug transactions) in 
evidence. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are the following: 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, §14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Section 58-57-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
any person knowingly and intentionally to distribute 
value or possess with intent to distribute for value 
controlled or counterfeit substance. 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person knowingly and intentionally to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value or to negotiate or to have 
a controlled substance distributed or dispensed for value 
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and distribute, dispense, or negotiate the distribution or 
dispensing of any other liquid, substance, or material 
instead of the specific controlled substance so offered, 
agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
Section 76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
Every person, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as 
a party for such conduct. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppotunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident. 
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Rule 803(8), Utah Rules of Evidence 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
Public records and reports. Records, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the 
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters 
observed pursuant to duty to report, excluding, 
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) 
in civil actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASg 
This is a criminal case. Defendant (DeAlo) and 
Co-defendant (Villa) were jointly charged with the second 
degree felony of possession with intent to distribute for value 
a controlled substance, contrary to Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. The case was severed 
and each Defendant was tried to a jury separately. Both were 
convicted as charged and sentenced to prison and fined the sum 
of $10,000.00. 
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The facts of the case are not complicated. On 
February 12, 1986, Officer James D. Hillin, Utah Highway Patrol, 
stopped a vehicle for speeding near Salina, Utah (TR 70-71). 
Defendant was the driver of the car (TR 82) and Co-defendant 
Villa was a passenger. Officer Hillin searched the car at the 
scene of the stop (TR 74) claiming a written consent to do so 
from DeAlo (TR 73). During an initial forty-five minute search 
(TR 152), he observed a metal container in the trunk (TR 75). 
He then left the scene, but returned an hour and one half later 
(TR 152-3), armed with a search warrant (TR 77). During that 
time the car was moved by police officers to an impound lot (TR 
153). Officers then began a dismantling of the car (TR 78) 
using power tools (TR 155), which resulted in the discovery of 
five wrapped packages (TR 79), shown to be cocaine after 
analysis by the State Crime Lab (TR 88 $ 92). The narcotics 
were found solely within the metal box inside the trunk of the 
vehicle (TR 152). 
Defendant testified that he was a native of Columbia 
(TR 186) who moved to California in 1983 (TR 168-69) and 
obtained employment with a Carlos Clibe, the husband of a 
cousin (TR 169). He was formally introduced to Villa in 
February, 1986 (TR 170), but had seen him at a social gathering 
(TR 170) on an earlier occasion (TR 183). 
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Defendant was invited by Villa to accompany him to New 
York (TR 173) and he arranged a two week leave from his 
employment for that purpose (TR 173). The two left Los Angeles 
on February 12, 1986 (TR 174-75). Defendant had luggage which 
he placed in the trunk of the car (TR 175).j 
The car was owned by Antonio Villa, a brother of 
Co-defendant Villa (TR 86). It was registered in New York and 
Villa had lawful possession (TR 87). A check by Officer Hillin 
indicated the car was not stolen (TR 84). Defendant had a valid-
driver license (TR 83), as did Villa (TR 156). 
The car was filled with numerous items of personal 
property (SHT 16). Items such as plastic cases, tape cassettes, 
blankets, pillows, and personal clothing were located in the 
vehicle (SHT 16-17). The trunk of the vehicle contained suit-
cases, spare tires, extra fuel and a tool box (SHT 17). The 
vehicle was a medium sized car and both the floorboards and the 
trunk were described by Officer Hillin as "quite fulln with 
items of personal property (SHT 18). 
Officer Hillin acknowledged having substantial 
information about the car and its occupants before his search 
(SHT 18). He knew the addresses of Villa and Defendant (SHT 
18). He knew the car was registered to Antonio Villa in New 
York, and that Antonio Villa was the brother of Co-defendant 
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Villa (SHT 19). It was Officer Hillin who was told that the 
occupants were on vacation, en route from California to New 
York, The personal belongings in the car had been identified 
to him as belonging to Defendant and Villa (SHT 19) and he knew 
that each had personal effects in both the front and trunk of 
the car (SHT 20). 
Officer Hillin considered the so-called consent to 
search as being limited to the front of the car, and probably 
the trunk (SHT 24), but apparently did not view it as extending 
to containers within the car since he interrupted his efforts 
for the purpose of obtaining a search warrant. 
The Court held that neither Defendant nor Villa had 
standing to raise the issue of an unlawful search and seizure. 
Before the presentation of evidence at the suppression hearing, 
the Court observed: 
But I understand it's fundamental if 
they didn!t own the car, if they have 
no possessory interest in it, they have 
no standing period. I can start with 
that basic premise. (SHT 8-9) 
The ruling of the Court did not contain any factual 
findings. It merely stated that, "They have no standing under 
Rakas v. Illinois" (SHT 30). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I -- Defendant had the joint use and possession 
of a vehicle containing numerous items of personal belongings 
while en route from California to New York. He had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the car. A search of the car invaded 
those privacy interests. He had standing to attack the search. 
The Court erred in holding that standing did not exist. The 
Court's error was two-fold. (1) The Court failed to find a 
possessory interest in the car by Defendant, contrary to the 
Court's own announced standard, and (2) the Court failed to 
consider joint possession, joint use, expectation of privacy 
and other factors which indicate standing. 
Point II -- The Court allowed an "aiding and abetting11 
instruction under UCA §76-2-202, contrary to both statutory and 
case law which clearly indicate that the legislature has 
mandated the employment of a jury instruction for "arranging" 
pursuant to UCA § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) in a case of this nature. 
Point III -- The Court admitted Exhibit #11, a 
California search warrant and its supporting affidavit, which 
was rank hearsay and not admissible under an enumerated 
exception to the hearsay rule. The exhibit also implied other 
crimes or wrongdoing on the part of Defendant, contrary to Rule 
404(b), URE, and which was highly prejudicial to Defendant and 
therefore inadmissible under Rule 403, URE. 
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Point IV -- The Court admitted Exhibit #14, an 
accounting or ledger of narcotic sales, which indicated other 
crimes or wrongdoing by Defendant, having no relationship to 
the crime at issue, in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b), URE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE, 
Defendant contends that the trial Court committed error 
in holding that he did not have standing to contest the search 
of the automobile. He claims to have had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched, a standard which the trial 
Court failed to employ. 
Relying on Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the 
trial Court considered only the factors of ownership and pos-
session as supplying the requisite basis to show standing to 
attack the lawfulness of a search and/or seizure. As subse-
quent argument will show, an assessment of Rakas, supra, and 
the overwhelming body of federal case law, reveals that the 
trial Court's ,fbasic premise" is clearly erroneous and that to 
establish standing in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a criminal 
defendant must show only a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
- li-
the area searched, not a proprietary or possessory interest in 
the area searched. But putting aside the undeniable precept 
that since the trial Court employed the wrong standard against 
which to test the evidence of standing, thus necessitating a 
reversal because there is no lawful finding of standing to 
review, let us nevertheless cut into the core of the defective 
analysis. 
At the outset, it is worthwhile to review the factual 
content of the Rakas opinion. After receiving a robbery report, 
police stopped the suspected getaway car, which the owner was 
driving and in which petitioners were passengers. Upon search-
ing the car, the police found a box of rifle shells in the glove 
compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat 
and arrested petitioners. Before trial, petitioners moved to 
suppress the rifle shells on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, but the trial court denied the motion on the ground 
that petitioners lacked standing to object to the lawfulness of 
the search of the car because they did not own either the car 
or the rifle and shells. 
In that factual context, the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed. The basis of the ruling however, was that an 
automobile passenger in that particular context did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. 
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The Rakas opinion, however, firmly established that: 
One who owns or la\*fully possess or 
controls property will in all likeli-
hood have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy by virtue of his right to 
exclude. (Page 143, n. 12) 
In Rakas, the Supreme Court abandoned the rule 
previously enunciated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 
(1967), which held that a person who is legitimately on the 
premises has standing to litigate the issue of the search of 
the location. In so ruling, the supreme Court noted: 
Jones v. United States (citation omit-
ted) and Katz v. United States (citation 
omitted) involved significantly 
different factual circumstances. Jones 
not only had permission to use the 
apartment of his friend, but had a key 
to the apartment with which he admitted 
himself on the day of the search and 
kept possessions in the apartment. 
Except with respect to his friend, 
Jones had complete dominion and contol 
over the apartment and could exclude 
others from it. Likewise in Katz the 
defendant occupied the telephone booth, 
shut the door behind him to exclude all 
others and paid the toll which entitled 
him to assume that the words he uttered 
into the mouthpiece would not be 
broadcast to the world. Katz and Jones 
could legitimately expect privacy in 
the areas which were the subject of the 
search and seizure sought to contest. 
(Page 149)(Emphasis supplied). 
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In United States v. Portillo. 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 
1980), the Ninth Circuit employed the above reasoning from Rakas 
and held that a defendant, who had both permission to use his 
friend's automobile and keys to the ignition and trunk, with 
which he could exclude all others, save the owner of the auto-
mobile, had standing to challenge the propriety of the search 
of the trunk of the automobile. The Ninth Circuit declared at 
Page 1317: 
Here, Montellano had both permission to 
use his friend1s automobile and the keys 
to the ignition and the trunk, with 
which he could exclude all others, save 
his friend, the owner. Montellano, 
therefore, possesses the requisite 
legitimate expectation of privacy 
necessary to challenge the propriety of 
the search. 
In United States v. Posey, 663 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 
1981), the Court held that the defendant had an expectation of 
privacy in an automobile owned by his wife and over which he 
was exercising exclusive control pursuant to her permission at 
the time of the search, despite the fact that he did not own 
the automobile or guns discovered during the search. In United 
States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1984), the Eighth 
Circuit neld that a defendant who had been given permission by 
his sister to use her car, although seated as a passenger, had 
- 14-
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and had standing 
to assert his Fourth Amendment claim regarding the search of 
the trunk. 
It is well established that a person may have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in a place or object which he does 
not own. United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 
1982). In Perez, defendants who had entered into a formalized 
arrangement for the transportation of contraband in a pickup 
truck being driven by an accomplice and who kept the truck under 
close surveillance by riding in it or following it in another 
vehicle had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck, 
even though they did not own it and even though the truck had 
been hired by another person for another purpose. 
As outlined in the Rakas opinion, legitimate presence 
in the area searched accompanied by the ability to exclude 
others from that area confers upon the person a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the area searched,. In analyzing 
Jones, supra, the Rakas court specifically noted that Jones not 
only had the permission of his friend, but also had a key and 
kept possessions in the apartment. 
Here, as in Jones, Defendant and Villa had permission 
to use the car for an extended two week vacation. There was a 
legitimate presence in the area searched. Here, as in Jones, 
- 15-
Defendant had a key to the area searched. JThe facts adduced at 
the suppression hearing show that Defendant was the driver of 
the vehicle and in fact had to use that key to open the trunk 
of the car. Defendant had complete dominion and control over 
the vehicle and could exclude others from it. Here, as in 
Jones, Defendant kept his possessions in the area searched. 
Here, as in Jones, the inevitable conclusion is that Defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. 
The Rakas decision and its progeny overwhelmingly establish 
this analytical conclusion. 
Conceptually, the case for standing becomes even 
stronger when a person has made the area searched his temporary 
living quarters. In United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 
(5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to records 
secreted in his parent's home and under their bed, where the 
defendant's parents had given him permission to use their home 
and had given him a key. As outlined in Haydel, supra, at Page 
1155: 
The defendant in Jones, similarly, had 
permission to use the place searched, 
the apartment of a friend, had a key to 
the apartment, and kept possessions 
there. Except with respect to the 
owner, Jones had control over the 
apartment and could exclude others. 
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The Supreme Court, in Rakas, 
specifically observed that it did not 
question the conclusion in Jones that 
the defendant suffered a violation of 
his personal Fourth Amendment rights if 
the search in question was unlawful. 
It is irrelevant if the temporary living quarters 
which the person occupies are mobile. In United States v. 
Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984), the First Circuit hel 
that the defendants had standing to challenge the search and 
seizure of a vessel because the defendants had a right of 
privacy in the vessel to the extent afforded any crew member 
a small sailing vessel on the high seas. At Page 423 the Co 
It is true that defendants have asserted 
that they played no part as owners of 
the boat or the marijuana, or as 
financers, or managers of the importa-
tion scheme. But they were the only 
ones aboard the Nirvana at the time of 
the seizure. They had charge of her 
day-to-day operations and she was their 
temporary home. In United States v. 
Lochan, (citation omitted) , we" analyzed 
Rakas in detail and the cases leading to 
it and flowing from it. We concluded 
that some of the factors relevant to a 
privacy expectation are legitimate 
presence in the area searched, 
possession or ownership of the area 
searched or the property seized, prior 
use of the area searched or the property 
seized, ability to exclude others use 
of the property, and a subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
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In the factual context of this case, Defendant and 
Villa had made the automobile in question their temporary home. 
The facts adduced in the proceedings below Show that they were 
in the midst of traveling from California to New York. Personal 
possessions of both were found in the interior and trunk of the 
vehicle. Among those personal items were pillows and blankets. 
It is abundantly clear that both were living in the vehicle 
during the course of a coast to coast trip. As in Pringle, 
supra, they had charge of the day-to-day operations of the 
vehicle, and the vehicle was their temporary home. 
Applying the factor analysis employed in the Pringle 
decision, it is abundantly clear that Defendant had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the area searched. There was 
legitimate presence in the area searched. Villa!s brother had 
given permission for the use of the vehicle. Defendant had 
possession of the area searched. Both Defendant and Villa had 
prior use of the area searched. Defendant had the ability to 
exclude others from the area searched. He possessed the keys 
to the vehicle!s interior and the vehicle's trunk, and mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched. 
It cannot be credibly argued that someone who puts an item in a 
secret metal compartment in the trunk of a car has not manifes-
ted a subjective expectation of privacy. $ee e.g. United States 
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v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982) (Defendants who placed 
contraband in an automobile gas tank manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy). 
The key analytical concept stemming from the Rakas 
opinion is that a criminal defendant must have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place,, The Rakas Court 
Katz v. United States (citation omitted) 
provides guidance in defining the scope 
of the interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. In the course of repudiating 
the doctrine derived from Olmstead v. 
United States (citation omittedf) and 
Goldman v. United States, (citation 
omitted) that if police officers had 
not been guilty of a common-law trespass 
they were not prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment from eavesdropping, the Court 
in Katz held that capacity to claim the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment 
depends not upon a property right in 
the invaded place but upon whether the 
person who claims the protection of the 
Amendment has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the invaded place. (Page 
143) 
The Supreme Court of Utah has developed the law of 
standing in a manner which parallels that of the many federal 
cases which have addressed the issue. In State v. Purcell, Utah 
586 P.2d 441 (1978), the Defendant was apprehended in a stolen 
vehicle. The car in question was searched pursuant to a search 
warrant, and the Defendant attacked the search warrant claiming 
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that it was issued without probable cause. The Court held that 
Defendant did not have standing to attack the warrant because 
of the absence of any possessory or proprietary interest. At 
Page 443 of this opinion, the Court stated: 
It is to be noted at the outset that 
this appeal is without merit for one 
very obvious reason, if for no other. 
Defendant simply lacks standing in 
court to attack the warrant as to the 
search of the stolen automobile, since 
on the facts before us, defendant had 
absolutely no possessory or proprietary 
interest therein that could have been 
invaded. 
In State v. Valdez, Utah, 689 P.2d 1334 (1984), the 
State introduced evidence that officers had found in an attache 
case which was searched pursuant to a vehicle inventory. The 
Court observed that it did not reach the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the search, under either the Constitution of Utah 
or that of the United States, because of its view that standing 
was not shown by the Defendant. However, unlike Purcell, supra, 
the Court in Valdez linked the issue of standing with the 
concept of legitimate expectation of privacy. Citing both 
Purcell, supra, and Rakas, supra, the Court stated at Page 1335: 
We do not reach the question of whether 
this search was permissible under the 
state or federal constitution. Defen-
dant concedes that he did not own the 
car or the attache case containing the 
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evidence complained of, and he has 
failed to show that he had any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the 
effects searched. Under long-established 
precedent, he lacks any standing to 
complain of the resulting search. 
In State v. Iacono, Utah, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, No. 
20434 (September 23, 1986), the Court broadened its discussion 
of those factors which are material to a consideration of the 
standing issue. The Defendant in Iacono attacked the warrant-
less search of a trailer which was owned by his mother. In 
holding that the Defendant had made no show of standing, the 
Court spoke of those factors which come into play with reference 
to a constitutionally protectible interest. The factors men-
tioned by the Court were (a) ownership, (b) use, (c) possession, 
and (d) legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. The 
observation of the Court appears at Page 27 of the opinion: 
But the stipulated evidence also fails 
to support defendant's assertion of a 
constitutiona11y protectible interest 
in the trailer or its contents. There 
is no evidence that he shared ownership, 
use, or possession of the trailer. 
Defendant does not show any legitimate 
expecation of privacy in the premises. 
In the instant matter, Defendant has made a showing 
that he satisfies all but one of the factors which the Court in 
Iacono viewed as being critical to determine whether standing 
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exists. The only factor missing from the facts of the instant 
case is that of ownership. Defendant did not claim that he was 
the owner of the car. However, he did claim a shared use and 
shared possession of the vehicle, and an obvious expectation of 
privacy in the car and its contents. 
From the foregoing we can see that the trial Court 
committed a two-fold error. First, the trial Court viewed an 
ownership or possessory interest as being the only factors to 
support a claim of standing, but then denied effect to its own 
announced standard in ruling that standing did not exist in the 
face of a clear showing that Defendant had a possessory interest 
in the car. Second, the Court totally failed to consider 
factors other than possession or ownership. No consideration 
was given to the factors of use, possession, or the legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the effects within the vehicle as 
well as the vehicle itself, nor the other factors announced by 
the federal cases cited above. 
POINT II -- IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF nAIDING AND ABETTING" AS 
DEFINED IN UCA §76-2-202. 
The Jury was charged with Instruction No. 15 (TR 202-3) 
which was a verbatim recitation of UCA §76-2-202. Defendant 
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took exception to that instruction (TR 190) and cited State v. 
Hicken, Utah, 659 P.2d 1038 (1983) (TR 192) to support his 
argument. The State's theory was that Defendants conduct 
could make him culpable as either a principal or accessory (TR 
195, Lines 3 and 4). The Court observed as well that the 
breadth of UCA §76-2-202 would include both conduct of a 
principal and accessory (TR 195-6). Defendant argued that UCA 
§76-2-202 was simply not applicable because of the mandate of 
UCA §58-37-19. That section reads as follows: 
It is the purpose of this act to 
regulate and control the substances 
designated within §58-37-4, and 
whenever the requirements prescribed, 
the offense defined or the penalties 
imposed relating to substances 
controlled by this act shall be or 
appear to be in conflict with Title 58, 
Chapter 17 or any other laws of this 
state, the provisions of this act shall 
be controlling. 
Defendant advised the Court of the need to utilize the 
provisions of UCA § 58-37-8(1)(a) (iv), if at all, in charging the 
jury with an "aiding and abetting" theory (TR 191-2), contending 
that the Utah Controlled Substances Act, UCA §58-37-1, et seq 
had foreclosed the application of UCA §76-2-202 in a case of 
this nature (TR 191). 
The harm which resulted to Defendant from employment 
of Instruction No. 15 is further highlighted when the evidence 
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and the State's theory are examined. In opening argument, 
counsel for the State indicated that documentary evidence would 
be offered which would show that Defendant was the author and 
custodian of journal entries, accounts and receipts detailing 
the distribution of controlled substances (TR 102-3). In its 
cross examination, the State suggested that Defendant was the 
keeper of records (TR 181), that he had purchased airline 
tickets for others to travel to and from Columbia (TR 182), and 
that he provided one Fernando Blanco with a house (TR 183), 
Blanco being a dealer in cocaine (TR 185). It is also of inter-
est that the affidavit and search warrant (Exhibit #11) which 
Defendant found objectionable, parades before the Jury a large 
panorama of people and addresses in Los Angeles, California and 
Brownsville, Texas. These documents weave tales of searches, 
seizures, and arrests involving cocaine trafficking over a 
period of two years. Interestingly, however, Defendant's name 
is nowhere to be found in that conglomerate of inflammatory and 
prejudicial hearsay. Nay, hearsay, upon hearsay, upon hearsay, 
ad infinitum. What more could the Jury conclude than that 
Defendant was an arranger, or that Defendant allowed Fernando 
Blanco to use his home when Blanco was in the business of 
distributing cocaine. The latter proposition is revealed by 
the affidavit (Exhibit #11) which states that Jose Fernando 
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Blanco was receiving mail at Indiana Street, and that a vehicle 
registered to him was followed to Indiana Street by a Detective 
Mahoney. This factual scenario is paralleled in State v. Scott, 
50 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, Case No. 860284 (1987). In Scott, at 
Page 14, the Court observed: 
As mandated by the specific provisions 
of sections 58-37-19 and 76-1-103(1), 
the owner of a home cannot be charged 
with having aided and abetted another 
when he or she can be charged with 
specifically having permitted his or 
her home to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully distributing controlled 
substances therein. Likewise, a person 
cannot be charged with aiding and 
abetting another when he or she handles 
the negotiations and price of a 
constrolled substance, but must instead 
by charged with agreeing, consenting, 
offering, or negotiating to distribute 
a controlled substance as specifically 
provided in section 58-37-8(1)(a) (iv). 
Scott held that it was reversible error to charge the 
Jury under UCA §76-2-202 as opposed to a charge under UCA 
§58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). The instant matter must be resolved in a 
like manner. Indeed, this case is a near identical replay of 
Scott. The prosecution claimed that Defendant afforded Jose 
Fernando Blanco, a reputed drug dealer, the use of his home for 
that purpose, and that Defendant was the keeper of records, 
which catalogued receipts, deliveries, prices, etc., for the 
unlawful operations. Conduct of that nature is the very thing 
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which is proscribed by the "arranging" provisions of UCA 
§58-37-8(l)(a)(iv). 
If the so-called "California evidence" was deleted 
from consideration, which Defendant claims it should have been, 
then an "arranging" instruction would still have been proper. 
Like the Scott case, the instant matter presented facts which 
placed the Defendant at or near a scene involving the alleged 
distribution or possession of a controlled substance, but a 
scene which reveals the participation of other persons in the 
events which transpire, such that the Jury is presented with a 
question as to who is the principal versus who is the arranger. 
The reasoning and holding of Scott, both in overruling 
State v. Jeppson, Utah, 546 P.2d 894 (1976) and in following 
Hicken, supra, should be the law of this case: 
Under the just-cited criteria, section 
58-37-19 controls. Although the penalty 
for aiding and abetting would be the 
same as the penalty for arranging to 
distribute, the offenses defined under 
the aiding and abetting statute are 
different from those defined under the 
arranging section. The actus reus under 
section 76-2-202 is soliciting, request-
ing, commanding, encouraging, or aiding 
in the substantive offense of distribu-
tion. The actus reus under section 
58-37-8(1)(a) (iv) constitutes an act of 
agreement, consent, offer, or arrange-
ment to distribute. That conflict must 
been resolved under the Act, not 
outside it...(Page 14). 
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Under the Act, it matters very much 
what the role of a defendant is in an 
exchange of controlled substances for 
money. Under the circumstances here, 
it was error to allow the State to 
instruct the jury on aiding and 
abetting. The jury may well have found 
defendant guilty of distribution, but 
it is equally likely that it convicted 
him of aiding and abetting. That 
speculation is insufficient foundation 
for upholding the verdict.(Page 15) 
POINT III -- IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ADMIT 
EXHIBIT #11 IN EVIDENCE. 
During the course of the trial, the State called one 
Donald H. Barfield, a member of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment, who identified Exhibit #11 as an affidavit and search 
warrant for various locations in the Southern California area 
(TR 112). Of the many searches which were presumably conducted 
under authority of this warrant, Officer Barfield was in charge 
of one directed to a home at 6591 Indiana Street, in Buena Park 
(TR 113). That search occurred on February 19, 1986 (TR 131), 
a week after Defendant had been arrested in Utah. That particu-
lar effort was but a small portion of a much larger law enforce-
ment operation which was undertaken to spoil what was viewed as 
a major international cocaine distribution effort, although the 
search of Indiana Street did not produce any cocaine (TR 144-
45). 
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Defendant objected to the introduction of Exhibit #11, 
and lengthy discussion was held on the issuk outside the 
presence of the Jury (TR 115-131). The State offered the 
exhibit as a foundation for the testimony of Officer Barfield 
and the items found by him when he searched Indiana Street. 
The Court received the exhibit under the same rationale. The 
discussion among the Court and counsel is instructive: 
THE COURT: ...so he has to iky his 
foundation. And the only purpose of 
this is to lay a foundation for acts 
this officer did and things hp found... 
(TR 125, Lines 23, 24 and 25; TR 126, 
Line 1) 
MR. BROWN: That!s correct. (TR 126, 
Line 3) 
Defense counsel could not see the |logic of admitting 
the exhibit when the State suggested it be 'received but not 
given to the Jury: 
MR. BROWN: I have no objection if the 
Jury doesn!t see this document... (TR 
126, Lines 8 and 9) 
MR. TAYLOR: If the Jury's not going to 
see it I don!t see that it has any 
purpose. (TR 126, Lines 13 and 14) 
Nevertheless, the exhibit was received, and it did go to the 
Jury (TR 129). 
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A search warrant and its supporting affidavit may be 
proper items of evidence in the context of a motion to suppress, 
but they are certainly not necessary items to lay the foundation 
for the testimony of an officer who conducts the search. Other-
wise, we would be asking the Jury to pass upon the legality of 
the search itself. A statement which is inadmissible hearsay 
is not rendered admissible because it is transformed from oral 
form to a writing, or because it is embodied in an affidavit. 
An affidavit for a search warrant has no greater legal dignity 
than any other item of hearsay. It is inadmissible. Hall v. 
State, (1939) 136 Tex Crim 320, 125 SW2d 293. 
It is the fruit of the search and not its justifica-
tion which should have the attention of the Jury. Accordingly, 
the basis of the State in offering Exhibit 11, and its receipt 
by the Court, that is, for foundational reasons, is meaning-
less. There is no rule of law or evidence which requires the 
admission of an affidavit and search warrant in evidence as a 
necessary prerequisite to the testimony of the officer who 
conducts the search and locates contraband or other physical 
evidence at the place of the search. However, the greater 
question is whether the exhibit is objectionable because 
of its content. Defendant urges the following in that regard. 
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Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Exhibit #11 is hearsay upon hearsay, upon hearsay, etc. 
It recites the observations of state and federal officers 
covering a period of two years and ranges from Brownsville, 
Texas to the Southern California area. Over twenty suspected 
drug dealers are named. Searches, arrests and convictions 
involving large amounts of cocaine and cash are set forth in 
great detail. The documents talk about Everything and every-
bodyM except Defendant and this case. Defendant is not 
mentioned, nor alluded to in this conglomerate of tale and 
intrigue, nor is the Co-defendant Villa mentioned. There is 
also total silence as to any traffic to or through Utah. 
Being hearsay in total, Exhibit #11 was not admissible 
unless received pursuant to a specific 1 aw or under one of the 
hearsay exceptions. Rules 802 and 803, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
With reference to the former, the preliminary committee note to 
tiie Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
Any existing statutes inconsistent with 
these rules, if and when these rules 
are adopted by the Supreme Court, will 
be impliedly repealed. 
If the affidavit portion of Exhibit #11 is viewed as 
being in the nature of a police report, or series of police 
reports, which in reality it is, then it is clearly inadmissible 
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under the rule announced in State v. Bertul, Utah, 664 P.2d 
1181 (1983). The issue in Bertul was the admissibility of a 
police booking sheet under the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule. It was decided under prior Rule 63(13), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. In Bertul, the Court reviewed a long history 
of case law and concluded that police reports, when offered by 
the prosecution, Mshould ordinarily be excluded ..." (Page 
1185). The reasoning of the Court is seen by the following: 
In most cases dealing with police 
reports of a criminal investigation, it 
is apparent that the reports are made 
in part in contemplation of litigation. 
Although the reports may not be readily 
describable as "dripping with motivation 
to misrepresent," [quoting from Palmer 
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 
87 L.Ed 645 (1943)] their exclusion is 
more fundamentally explainable on the 
ground that substantial rights under 
the confrontation clause of the United 
States Constitution, and especially the 
right of cross-examination, may be 
severely prejudiced when the 
information in the report calls into 
question the motivation and the 
accuracy of perception, recall, the 
manner of language usage, or the 
soundness of conclusions by the author 
of the report. Cf. Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 
1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (the right 
to cross-examine is essential to a fair 
trial). It would be "error and 
ordinarily reversible error to receive 
an exhibit containing !a neat 
condensation of the government's whole 
case against the defendantT" in the 
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form of a police report for which there 
can be no effective cross-examination. 
United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 529 
(8th Cir.1974) (denial of rehearing; 
main opinion at 491 F.2d 517) (quoting 
Sanchez v. United States, supra, 293 
F.2d at 269; United States v. Ware, 
supra, 247 F.2d at 700). We have long 
ago forsaken the practice of allowing a 
person to be convicted on the basis of 
out-of-court statements, whether 
written or oral, of persons not subject 
to cross-examination. 
If Exhibit #11 is viewed as a public record, then it 
is inadmissible by the very rule that would receive public 
reports and records as exceptions to the hearsay rule. The 
applicable provision in this regard is Rule 803(8), Utah Rules 
of Evidence, which calls for the admission of a broad range of 
public documents but excludes "... in criminal cases matters 
observed by police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel...". Exhibit #11 is the very thing which this Rule 
excludes. It consists entirely of matters observed by police 
officers in criminal cases. Accordingly, it cannot come in 
evidence as a public record exception to the hearsay rule. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Exhibit #11 is also objectionable because it implies 
the commission by Defendant of other crimes or wrongs in 
general. Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. That may very 
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well have been a specific purpose of the prosecution in seeking 
its admission. The trial Court initially inquired of the State 
in that regard: 
THE COURT: What is the purpose of this 
evidence? (TR 103, Line 15) 
MR. BROWN: The purpose is to show his 
involvement in the distribution of 
controlled substances (TR 103, lines 16 
and 17). 
Counsel for the State continued his explanation, but 
changed his theory to one of attacking Defendant's credibility 
by indicating his intent to rebut claims of Defendant which 
were contained in pleadings filed in connection with a motion 
for severance (TR 103). The problem with that approach is that 
the Jury never saw those pleadings (they were never offered in 
evidence) but the Jury was exposed to Exhibit #11. The assault 
against Defendant's character was complete. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible 
if relevant to prove some material fact in the crime or charge 
on trial. The admissible purposes, stated by illustration in 
Rule 404, such as opportunity, intent, preparation, etc., mean 
opportunity for the crime on trial, or intent to commit the 
crime on trial, or preparation for the crime on trial, not 
opportunity, or intent, or preparation for some other crime. 
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State v. Forsyth, Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982). Exhibit #11 does 
not contain one scintilla of information which has the slightest 
relationship to the present case. 
Rule 405, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Defendant also contended that Exhibit #11 was highly 
prejudicial (TR 124-5). Such evidence may be excluded if its 
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice:. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. A reading 
of the Exhibit should be sufficient argument for support of this 
proposition. Even if this Exhibit had relevance, the Court did 
not, and could not, assess its "inherent reliability". State 
v. Schreuder, Utah, 39 Adv. Rep. 46 (8-15-86). There was no 
evidence contained in the exhibit, let alone relevant evidence, 
that could not have been presented by means of the testimony of 
Officer Barfield, thus avoiding the prejudicial impact. State 
v. Cloud, Utah, 722 P.2d 750 (1986). If by some strained logic, 
Exhibit #11 is construed to show participation of Defendant in 
a drug transaction, it would nevertheless be objectionable (see 
cases annotated at 93 ALR 2d 1097-1115, and supplement, 
Admissibility, in Prosecution for Illegal Sale of Narcotics, of 
Evidence of Other Sales). 
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POINT IV -- THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT 14 IN 
EVIDENCE. 
Exhibit #14 was admitted over objection of Defendant 
on grounds, among others, that it, too, was inadmissible 
evidence of other crimes or wrongs (TR 143),. The same argument 
regarding Exhibit #11, above, applies with even greater force 
to this exhibit. The State produced Jeffery Martin Gordon 
LaSuis1, an agent of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration 
(TR 136) who testified that Exhibit #14 was a record of cocaine 
transactions (TR 139-41). The document itself was in Spanish, 
and presumably unintelligible to the Jury on its face, but 
coupled with Officer LaSuis' testimony, it was highly damaging 
to Defendant. Defendant admitted being the author, in part, of 
the document (TR 177), although his explanation was that he 
prepared it at the request of another (TR 178) to reflect 
records of a canning or bottling plant (TR 179). Notwith-
standing that explanation, the impact on the Jury could only 
have been significant. The problem with the exhibit, if the 
LaSuisf testimony is believed, is that it shows Defendant as 
having participated in a distribution of cocaine in California 
at a place and at a time which have no relationship to the crime 
on trial. The absence of any such connection is revealed by the 
testimony of LaSuis1 who stated that two packages of cocaine 
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bearing the markings lfSKFM and l!P35!f were found in the posses-
sion of one Lorize Fernando Vega, who was arrested in California 
in January, 1986. Those same code markings appear in Exhibit 
#14 (TR 160). However, the State did not offer any evidence to 
connect the cocaine which was seized in the instant case with 
any cocaine which may have been identified by the codes which 
appear in Exhibit #14. Indeed, the cocaine seized in the case 
at bar had no cryptic markings on the packages. 
The danger in admitting evidence of prior crimes and 
wrongs is explained in State v. Saunders, Utah, 699 P.2d 738, 
741 (1985), wherein the Court stated: 
The basis of these limitations on the 
admissibility of evidence of prior 
crimes is the tendency of a fact finder 
to convict the accused because of bad 
character rather than because he is 
shown to be guilty of the offenses 
charged. Because of this tendency, 
such evidence is presumed prejudicial 
and, absent a reason for the admission 
of the evidence other than to show 
criminal disposition, the evidence is 
excluded (Emphasis added). 
The danger was fatal in the instant matter. The 
testimony of Officer LaSuis1 in interpreting Exhibit #14 could 
be seen to reflect that Defendant committed many other crimes, 
although separate and apart from the crime charged. The early 
case of State vs. Bowen, Utah, 134 P 623 (1913), is instructive. 
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In Bowen, the Defendant was convicted of larceny of a cow. The 
cow in question disappeared from the open range and was never 
seen again. However, witnesses saw five cattle hides and one 
horse hide thereafter at Defendant's barn. One hide was identi-
fied as that of the missing cow. Another hide was identified 
as belonging to another person. All of the hides were taken to 
the Courthouse at the time of trial, marked as exhibits, and 
admitted in evidence, except the horse hide. The Court held the 
admission of the hides, except that of the victim, to be preju-
dicial error, even though evidence was not presented to show 
that the other hides were from stolen cattle. However, the 
State made the inference that the other hides were from stolen 
cattle, and apparently that inference was buttressed by their 
very admission in evidence. If it was error to admit evidence 
of other crimes in Bowen, where the evidence was found at the 
same place and at the same time as the primary item of physical 
evidence for the crime charged, then how much greater is the 
error in the instant matter to admit evidence of an alleged 
drug ledger far removed in time and place from the facts of the 
crime at issue. 
If the State had offered Exhibit #14 as rebuttal 
evidence to impeach the credibility of Defendant, then it may 
well have been proper as a prior inconsistent statement (or 
- 37 -
conduct), and thus by definition not hearsay. Rule 801 (d)(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. However, that was not the course of 
the proceedings. Exhibit #14 was offered and received during 
the State!s case in chief. Defendant was then backed into a 
corner. He could live with the near t!mortal wound" or testify 
himself and attempt a healing explanation. The latter option 
was selected, but the patient died. The Jury was relegated to 
performing the burial. 
CONCLUSION 
Should the Court conclude that Defendant met the 
preliminary threshold so as to give him standing to attack the 
search of the vehicle, then he would be entitled to a remand to 
the trial Court to litigate the search and seizure issue. If 
any one of the other errors assigned on appeal, that is, the 
employment of an improper jury instruction, or the improper 
receipt of either Exhibit #11 or Exhibit #14, is found by this 
Court to have merit, then a remand for a new trial would 
likewise be the appropriate relief. Accordingly, if the Court 
finds merit as to any claim of Defendant, a remand is the 
appropriate remedy, and depending upon the view of this Court, 
a new trial would be either with or without consideration of 
the search and seizure issue. It is therefore necessary for 
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the Court to rule upon each of 
Otherwise, if a remand occurs, 
without appropriate guidelines 
new trial. 
the assignments of error, 
the trial Court would be left 
to follow in connection with a 
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